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A New Mode of European Regulation? 
The Implementation of the Autonomous
Framework Agreement on Telework in 
Five Countries
ABSTRACT ■ This article examines the implementation of the first
autonomous framework agreement signed by European social partners in a
number of member states. Although the telework agreement states that it is
to be implemented in accordance with national procedures and practices
specific to management and labour, practice is often different. The approach
adopted reflects the specific policy character of the telework agreement and
the ongoing power struggle between unions, employers and the state.
KEYWORDS: alternative regulation methods ■ autonomous agreements
■ Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Hungary and the UK ■ implementation
■ social dialogue
Introduction
Autonomous framework agreements between the European social part-
ners are a new form of regulation through social dialogue. The first agree-
ments on parental leave (1995), part-time work (1998) and temporary work
(1999) were transposed into legally binding directives, but those on tele-
work (2002) and work-related stress (2004) are to be implemented volun-
tarily at national level by the affiliates of the signatories. In this article, we
argue that implementation has only partly followed what we normally
consider the national ‘practices and procedures specific to management and
labour’. The choice of implementation method seems to be mainly deter-
mined by the specific policy type involved in the telework agreement, and
the power struggle between unions, employers and the state.
We examine the implementation of the telework agreement in Denmark,
Germany, Hungary, Sweden and the UK, very different labour market
regimes within EU. We first briefly discuss contemporary theories on
implementation before examining the extent to which the method of
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implementation and the procedures of negotiations and consultations have
led to differences from the countries’ traditional ways of regulating the
labour market.
Analytical Framework and Research Method
Studies of the implementation of European regulations show that relatively
new forms have been developed to transpose European policy into national
practice (Falkner et al., 2005). Member states often choose different imple-
mentation methods according to the type of policy under consideration, for
instance, legislation alone or in combination with collective agreements. The
few studies of the implementation of sectoral agreements, recommendations
and joint declarations signed by cross-sector organizations at European level
suggest that national social partners often issue guidelines for good practice,
or merely establish monitoring systems (Benedictus et al., 2002; Keller, 2005;
Pochet, 2005). National social partners may involve local or federal author-
ities in some initiatives, for instance on vocational training, while excluding
them from others.
The choice of implementation strategy seems to depend on three param-
eters: policy type, national regulation traditions for the labour market and
power games between the actors (Falkner et al., 2005; Lampinen and
Uusikylä, 1998; Rhodes, 2000). National regulation traditions are the rules
of the game or institutionalized power balances which traditionally regu-
late national labour markets (Strøby-Jensen et al., 1996). Power games
reflect short-term variations in the balance of power, and can emerge when
implementing specific labour market reforms.
It is common to distinguish three types of labour market regime: liberal-
pluralist, neo-corporatist and state dominated (Crouch, 1993; Visser, 1996).
We class Germany as a neo-corporatist regime while Denmark and to some
degree Sweden display a mixture of neo-corporatist and pluralist traditions
of regulation. In all three countries the labour markets are regulated primar-
ily through collective agreements designed by relatively well-organized and
strong trade unions and employers’ associations. The UK is a pluralist
regime, since the state has a limited role in regulating the labour market,
while social partners are relatively weak and have no mandate to engage in
national bargaining. The classification of Central and Eastern European
labour market systems has been subject to much debate. Since Hungary has
an extensive labour code and the social partners are relatively weak, we treat
it as a variation of an etatistic regime.
The policy network theory of Rhodes and Marsh (1992) demonstrates
the importance of power relations between government and key stakehold-
ers when designing and implementing policy. Government dependence on
key stakeholders, in this case social partners, can vary from one policy area
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to another; as a result, their participation in the political process differs
according to the policy area under consideration (Rhodes, 2000; Rhodes
and Marsh, 1992). However, stakeholders’ collaboration, understanding
and compliance with specific policy goals are crucial for the implementation
results, especially when governments rely on private and voluntary entities
to deliver their polices (Barrett and Fudge, 1981). The delegation of respon-
sibility for the implementation telework agreement to the social partners
rather than national governments may trigger new power games and forms
of collaboration, since some member states have no tradition of leaving
labour market regulation to social partners.
Various studies have shown that the policy type influences the choice of
implementation method and the way key stakeholders are involved in the
policy-making process (Larsen et al., 2006; Rhodes, 2000; Winter, 1994). We
define this as the specific content, the implementation obligations and the
responsibility for implementation prescribed by the agreement. One or
more of these can be primarily influential according to circumstances, such
as pressure from the EU, national or local levels.
We distinguish between three forms of negotiations and consultation
procedures. Collective bargaining entails bipartite negotiations between
the social partners (at confederal, sectoral or company level). Concertation
involves tripartite negotiations between the state and the social partners.
Consultation implies the exchange of different views, which do not neces-
sarily result in common negotiations or a common decision (Ishikawa,
2003). With respect to national implementation methods, we differentiate
between collective agreements, legislation and guidelines for good practice.
Our analysis is based on 16 interviews with representatives from
national ministries, trade unions and employers’ associations in Denmark,
Germany, Sweden, Hungary and the UK conducted during the autumn
2005 and spring 2006. A further 125 interviews were conducted with repre-
sentatives at sectoral level in Denmark, Germany and Sweden; because
negotiations at sectoral level are rare in Hungary and the UK, we did not
include the sector level in these countries. The interviews were by telephone
or face-to-face. They were recorded and then transcribed. A common cod-
ing scheme was used to analyse the interviews. In the following analysis, we
briefly describe the political process behind the telework agreement at
European level before examining the detail of the implementation process
at confederal and sectoral levels.
Negotiating the Telework Agreement
The telework agreement was signed by European social partners (ETUC,
UNICE/UEAPME and CEEP) on 16 July 2002, after eight months of
negotiations. It provided that teleworkers – defined as those who work
Larsen & Andersen: A New Mode of European Regulation?
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away from the employer’s premises regularly, and use information technol-
ogy to do so – should possess the same rights as comparable workers at the
employer’s premises. The aim was to enable companies to modernize their
work organization while assisting employees to reconcile work and family
life. As far as possible, the use of telework was to be voluntary on both
sides; there were provisions regarding health and safety and training; and
measures were to be taken to avoid teleworkers becoming isolated from
other employees. The European social partners and their member organ-
izations were responsible for implementing and monitoring the agreement.
The European Commission first issued proposals for the regulation of
telework in June 2000. Before the December 2001 Laeken Council, the
European social partners had announced their intention to develop ‘a spec-
trum of diversified instruments’ as alternatives to the legislative route,
including autonomous framework agreements (De Boer et al., 2005: 64).
However, the use of this instrument for telework was highly controversial.
UNICE, reflecting in particular the views of their British affiliate the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), at first opposed any form of regu-
lation. CEEP was in favour of an autonomous agreement, but the ETUC
was divided (Benedictus et al., 2002). Most Nordic affiliates supported an
autonomous agreement, but the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) and
some other continental unions argued in favour of a directive.
An important reason for agreement on this basis was that CEEP and
UNICE would accept nothing more binding; but several interviewees
also mentioned that the choice of regulation method reflected social part-
ners’ common wish to achieve increased autonomy from the European
Commission and to show that they still had a role to play despite their
failed attempt to reach an agreement on agency work. Country-specific
interests were also important. Nordic unions in particular wanted to test
the possibility of European regulation in a form consistent with their own
‘voluntarist’ principles; while southern European unions saw a voluntary
agreement as an opportunity to strengthen their role in their national polit-
ical systems. Telework was perceived as a relatively uncontroversial topic,
of peripheral concern in most member states (EIROnline, 1998). ‘Soft law’
is seen as appropriate for subjects such as telework, which often concern
the development of new practices and tools at company level rather than
protecting employees’ basic rights. The extent to which the policy type has
also influenced the national implementation process is examined below.
Implementing the Telework Agreement
The agreement was to be implemented by 15 July 2005, but only five of
the 25 member states (Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary, Spain and the
UK) met this deadline (Clauwaert et al., 2005). Most others had nearly
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completed the implementation process, but some countries (Denmark,
Austria, Czech Republic and Slovenia) had still not finalized implementa-
tion by mid-2006 and the position in two others (Lithuania and Cyprus)
was unclear (ETUC/UNICE/CEEP/UEAPME, 2006). Failure to com-
ply with EU implementation deadlines (even for binding directives) is not,
however, a new phenomenon (Falkner et al., 2005; Mastenbroek, 2005).
A range of implementation methods has been used in different countries:
legislation, collective agreements and guidelines for good practice (see
Table 1). Portugal and several new member states have followed national
traditions by transposing the telework agreement into legislation. The UK
and Ireland have issued guidelines for good practice. Collective agreements
or guidelines have been used in most other continental countries, though
Larsen & Andersen: A New Mode of European Regulation?
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TABLE 1. National Implementation Results
Legislation Collective Guidelines No informa-
agreements/ for good tion regarding
Framework practice the imple-
agreements mentation
method
Nordic 
countries Denmark, Sweden,
Sweden Denmark,
Finland, Norwayc
Norwayc
Icelandc
Continental Belgium, Belgium, Germany,
Europe Luxembourg France, Netherlands,
Germany, Austria
Luxembourg,
Southern Portugal
Europe Italy, Spain, Spain
Anglo-Saxon Greece UK,
countries Ireland
New member Czech Hungary, Czech Bulgariab, 
states and Republica, Latvia Republic, Cyprus
accession Hungary, Poland Latvia Croatiab, 
countries Slovakia, Lithuania,
Slovenia, Turkeyb
Estonia, 
Poland, Malta
Notes: auncertain whether telework is covered by existing legislation.
bNew candidate or accession countries.
cMembers of the European Economic Area who are obliged to implement the telework
agreement.
Source: Clauwaert et al. (2005: 1); ETUC/UNICE/CEEP/UEAPME (2006: 5–10).
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regulating the labour market through such guidelines is not part of most
national traditions, even though the telework agreement stated that imple-
mentation should be according to national ‘practices and procedures spe-
cific to management and labour’. The experience in the five countries
investigated also shows divergence between implementation method and
national regulatory traditions.
Denmark
In Denmark, the government left the implementation of the telework agree-
ment to the social partners, in line with its self-regulating principle and
voluntary nature. The implementation process seems to follow national
labour market traditions, where the social partners through collective bar-
gaining largely determine the labour market regulation (Due et al., 1994).
However, differences exist with respect to the way individual trade unions
and employers associations at confederal and sectoral levels have addressed
the implementation of the telework agreement.
At confederal level, the Ministry of Finance and Kommunernes Lands-
forening (KL), representing employers within the state and local govern-
ment sectors, and their union counterparts Central-organisationernes
Fællesudvalg (CFU) and Kommunale Tjenestemænd og Overenskom-
stansatte (KTO) agreed to include a reference to the European agreement
in their existing framework agreements on tele- and homework. According
to interviewees, this was decided because telework was already regulated in
the Danish public sector. However, it is questionable whether this can be
considered implementing the telework agreement by collective agreement.
In the private sector, some unions and employers’ associations have relied
on a similar procedure, while others have developed alternative methods or
chosen not to implement the agreement at all. No agreement has been
reached at confederal level, though negotiations are ongoing. The employ-
ers’ confederation Dansk Arbejdsiverforening (DA) favours a set of
guidelines for good practice, whereas the main union confederation
Landsorganisationen i Danmark (LO) argues that the agreement should be
implemented as a collective agreement. The outcome remains uncertain.
DA’s resistance to negotiating an agreement was reinforced by the fact that
other European countries with strong traditions of regulation by peak-level
collective agreement developed guidelines for good practice rather than fol-
lowing their national traditions. The voluntary nature of the telework
agreement has also, according to Danish interviewees, enabled DA to refuse
to sign a collective agreement or develop guidelines for good practice with
the professional confederation Akademikernes Centralorganisation (AC)
(Kristiansen, 2003).
This implies that the policy type, particularly the self-regulating principle
and legal status of the telework agreement, has triggered new power games
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(2)
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between some trade unions and employers’ associations and paved the way
for alternative implementation methods at confederal level. This questions
the force of Danish labour market traditions in this context.
At sectoral level, the great majority of private-sector unions and
employers’ associations have failed to implement the telework agreement.
However, implementation agreements have been reached in two major sec-
tors, manufacturing industry and commercial services; these have either
replicated the European agreement in existing collective agreements, or
used a similar method to the public sector. Affiliates of LO, DA and the
white-collar confederation Funktionærerne og Tjenestemændenes
Fællesråd (FTF) have also relied on different implementation methods. In
the private sector, only two affiliates of FTF and LO respectively have
implemented the telework agreement, using guidelines for good practice or
collective agreements. The sectoral unions and employers’ associations cite
a range of reasons for failure to implement the telework agreement in the
private sector (see Table 2).
Larsen & Andersen: A New Mode of European Regulation?
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TABLE 2. Implementation Results in the Danish Private Sector
DA LO FTF
Affiliates 13 18 98
Implementation Collective Collective Collective 
record agreements: 1 agreements: 8a agreements: 67a
Guidelines: 2 Guidelines: 1 Guidelines: 1
Reasons for 
non-compliance
No need to 7 8 10
regulate telework
Telework 1 7 3
irrelevant
Existing 3 3 11
guidelines/
agreements
No request 6 5 5
Unwilling – 2 1
Employers
Unawareness 1 1 4
No mandate/lack 1 – 2
resources
Feel no obligation 2 5 5
Don’t know 3 2 13
Notes: Different member organizations mentioned a range of reasons why they had
not implemented the telework agreement, which is why the numbers of answers
given and the number of member organizations are not the same.
aprimarily members in the public sector.
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In most cases, they already regulated telework by collective agreement,
or else thought that the issue was irrelevant to their members because of
the nature of their work. Hardly any unions or employers’ associations
had been asked by their members or counterparts to implement the tele-
work agreement. A few interviewees also claimed that they lacked com-
petence to sign a collective agreement on the issue, or stated that their
employer counterparts had been unwilling to implement the agreement.
Other unions and employers’ associations also reported that they felt no
obligation to implement the agreement because it was voluntary. This
suggests that the policy type, particularly the agreement’s content and
legal status have been crucial for the implementation record at sectoral level.
As a result, the influence of Danish regulatory traditions seems limited. This
tends also to be the case when telework was regulated by collective agree-
ment; some respondents still argued that collective agreements were not
always their preferred implementation method, although they generally
speaking supported the Danish collective agreement model. Employers
in particular reported that the content of the telework agreement and, in
particular its consistency with existing Danish rules, largely determined
their choice of implementation method.
In sum, the Danish case suggests that the policy type has triggered new
power games among social partners and paved the way for alternative
implementation methods which deviate from what we normally define as
Danish labour market traditions. As explained below, Denmark is not the
only country which has relied on alternative implementation methods.
Germany
The German social partners have also relied on a mix of implementation
methods ranging from collective agreements, joint declarations, guide-
lines for good practice to information pamphlets about the telework
agreement. These methods differ to some extent from what we normally
associate with German labour market traditions, and this is even more
marked when looking at the implementation method used by individual
trade unions and employers associations.
At confederal level, the social partners within the public and private
sectors have relied on different implementation methods. The private-
sector employers’ confederation Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen
Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA) signed a joint declaration with the union con-
federation Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), encouraging social part-
ners at sectoral and company levels to implement the agreement. These
organizations also held a conference with their counterparts from Austria,
Denmark and France, and published a pamphlet with guidelines for good
practice (BDA/ZDH/VKA/DGB, 2006). The confederation of artisan
producers Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks (ZDH) simply
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informed members about the telework agreement, while the peak organ-
izations in the public sector failed to implement the agreement because
they had no mandate to sign collective agreements. The civil service con-
federation Deutscher Beamtenbund (DBB) is not a member of ETUC and
felt no obligation to implement the agreement.
The interviewees from BDA and DGB also emphasized that they had no
mandate to negotiate collective agreements, but this was only part of the
reason why they chose to regulate telework through guidelines for good
practice. The content of the telework agreement is already regulated
through existing German legislation and the peak organizations therefore
found it unnecessary to transpose the agreement into legislation. In add-
ition, its legal status and self-regulating principle induced them to use
guidelines for good practice, as the only option when the implementation
responsibility lies with the national social partners and the agreement is vol-
untary. The implementation responsibility given to the peak organizations
has also instigated a relatively new form of social dialogue between them,
since they rarely collaborate on developing common policy according to
the German interviewees. This suggests that the policy type has largely
determined the choice of implementation method as well as the procedures
for negotiation at confederal level in Germany. Some peak organizations
have largely been able to ignore the agreement while others have developed
alternative implementation methods.
Most German trade unions and employers associations at sectoral level
have thus failed properly to implement the telework agreement. In the
public sector, the local authority employers (Vereinigung der kommunalen
Arbeitgeberverbände, VkA) has signed local agreements which cover
approximately 10,000 employees, but the Ministry of the Interior and the
Tarifgemeinschaft deutscher Länder (TdL), representing the federal and
Land-level employers, have failed to implement it (BDA/ZDH/VKA/
DGB, 2006). Likewise, relatively few trade unions and employers’ associ-
ations have implemented the telework agreement in the private sector.
BDA’s affiliate Gesamtmetall is the main exception, having signed local
agreements and guidelines with their counterpart IG Metall. BDA’s mem-
ber organization, the Employers Association of Insurance companies
(AGV), has also signed some local agreements and guidelines with their
local counterparts. The private-sector put forward a range of explanations
(see Table 3).
As in Denmark, most found it unnecessary to implement the telework
agreement. Few local and sectoral organizations already regulated tele-
work through collective agreements or guidelines, but the vast majority
saw regulations on telework as irrelevant for their own members. Several
union and employer representatives also reported that neither their mem-
bers nor counterparts had requested them to regulate telework as a result
of the European agreement. This suggests that the content of the agreement
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to some extent accounts for the relative poor implementation record.
However, some organizations also stated that they were unaware of the
telework agreement and some also felt no obligation to implement it
because of its voluntary nature. Thus the German case also suggests that
it is particularly the policy type which has paved the way for alternative
regulation methods, even in a country where legislation and collective
agreements are the most common forms of labour market regulations
(Marginson, 2005).
Sweden
The social partners have taken the lead in the implementation process in
Sweden, using collective agreements and guidelines at confederal and
sectoral levels. The peak organizations held a series of meetings, and in
December 2005 agreed on a common set of guidelines for good practice on
telework for both the public and private sectors, which stands in sharp con-
trast to the cases of Germany and Denmark. The negotiation procedures for
the telework agreement were, according to the Swedish interviewees, rela-
tively novel, since employment issues are primarily regulated through col-
lective agreements at sectoral level, while European labour market directives
tend to be implemented by legislation. The negotiation procedures and
TABLE 3. Implementation Results in the German Private Sector
BDA DGB
Affiliates 54 8
Implementation record Collective Collective 
agreements: 2 agreements: 2a
Guidelines: 2 Guidelines: 2a
Reasons for non-compliance
No need to regulate telework 8 3
Telework irrelevant 23 4
Existing 12 1
guidelines/agreements
No request 15 3
Unwilling employers – –
Unawareness 8 1
No mandate/lack resources – –
Feel no obligation 6 –
Don’t know 20 2
Note: Different member organizations mentioned a range of reasons as to why they
had not implemented the telework agreement, which is why the numbers of answers
given and the number of member organizations are not the same.
aonly some members at local level.
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implementation methods were also subject to much debate. The three trade
union confederations wanted to regulate telework according to Swedish
traditions of collective agreements, while the private employers (Svenskt
Näringsliv, SN) in particular opposed this, arguing that autonomous agree-
ments signed by European social partners represented a new form of regu-
lation for which Sweden had no precedent (Ahlberg, 2002). The unions
were forced to settle for guidelines which encourage rather than compel
social partners at sectoral level to implement the agreement, since SN was
unwilling to alter its position. This suggests that new power games have to
some extent been triggered at confederal level by the policy type under con-
sideration. These new power games seem to have been more influential than
Swedish regulatory traditions.
Such power games seem to have played only a limited role at sectoral
level, although a recent report by the white-collar confederation
Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (TCO) concluded that unwilling
employers had forced their affiliates to regulate the European agreement
through guidelines rather than collective agreements (TCO, 2005).
However, only one trade union at sectoral level mentioned this during the
interviews. Instead, the content of the telework agreement seems to explain
why the majority of Swedish trade unions and employers’ associations
failed to implement it in the private sector; while social partners in the pub-
lic sector decided to add a reference to the European agreement in their
existing collective agreement on telework.
Representatives from both sides of industry referred to this factor as the
main reason for their preferred implementation method. The public-
sector representatives stated that they already regulated telework through
collective agreements, but as in the Danish case, it is debatable whether
adding a reference rather than replicating the European agreement in their
collective agreements can be considered as proper implementation. Table
4 shows the number of organizations who have implemented the telework
agreement at sectoral level and the main arguments put forward by those
that failed to do so.
Among interviewees at sectoral level, eight TCO affiliates in the public
sector had transposed the telework agreement into collective agreements.
In the private sector, the employers’ associations for forestry and farming
and their counterpart the white-collar union (HTF) were the only mem-
ber organizations of TCO and SN to implement the telework agreement
through collective agreements, though guidelines for good practice were
agreed in three sectors. Among affiliates of the largest (manual workers’)
confederation, Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO), the metal workers’
union also agreed on guidelines for good practice with the employers.
Hence national regulatory traditions have only to some extent been fol-
lowed at sectoral level, although Sweden has strong traditions of collective
bargaining.
Larsen & Andersen: A New Mode of European Regulation?
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The most common explanations put forward by Swedish social part-
ners for their limited implementation of the telework agreement were
that their members or counterparts had not requested this, and that tele-
work was irrelevant for their members. Some unions and employers’
associations even reported that their organization had removed previous
regulations on telework from their collective agreements because their
members were not interested in working from home. This implies that
in Sweden too, the content of the telework agreement played an essential
role for the choice of implementation method. However, some inter-
viewees also reported that they were unaware of the telework agree-
ment and that they had limited competences to sign sectoral agreements.
A mix of factors seems therefore to have influenced the relatively poor
implementation record in Sweden. As a result, the Swedish regulatory
traditions seem to have had a limited influence on the implementation
process.
TABLE 4. Implementation results in the Sweden private sector
SN LO TCO
Affiliates 50 15 17
Implementation Collective Collective Collective 
record agreements: 1 agreements: agreements: 9a
Guidelines: 4 Guidelines: 1 Guidelines: 3
Reasons for 
non-compliance
No need to 3 5 1
regulate telework
Telework 12 3 8
irrelevant
Existing 4 1 3
guidelines/agreements
No request 13 6 1
Unwilling – – 1
employers
Unawareness 4 3 1
No mandate/lack 2 – –
resources
Feel no obligation 1 – –
Don’t know 23 4 5
Note: Different member organizations mentioned a range of reasons as to why they
had not implemented the telework agreement, which is why the numbers of answers
given and the number of member organizations are not the same.
aprimarily members in the public sector.
Source: ETUC/UNICE/CEEP/UEAPME (2006).
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The UK
In contrast to Denmark, Sweden and Germany, the British implementation
process has involved both social partners and the government. The TUC
and CBI took the lead in developing guidelines, while the government pro-
vided mediation, funding and monitoring. This form of implementation is
relatively novel in the UK, as the British government has been involved in
a negotiation process which deviates from the dominance of company-level
bargaining between unions and employers (Edwards et al., 1998). Tripartite
negotiations, where social partners take the lead, are also relatively unusual
in the British political system, where governments usually possess an over-
all parliamentary majority and can implement labour market reforms uni-
laterally (Taylor-Gooby, 2001). According to the British interviewees, the
relatively new policy style has been triggered by the telework agreement’s
voluntary nature and self-regulating principle. The British government
therefore found it unnecessary to legislate, but participated in the negoti-
ations after receiving an invitation from the TUC and CBI.
The British interviewees also reported that it was mainly the CBI’s ini-
tiative to invite the government to host the negotiations. It feared that
bipartite negotiations with the TUC would signal its acceptance of social
partnership and collective bargaining at confederal level, which it funda-
mentally opposes. However, it is noticeable that CBI was eventually will-
ing to negotiate with the TUC. According to the interviewees, it could
hardly reject implementing the telework agreement, even though this
required negotiation with the TUC, since the voluntary nature of the tele-
work agreement reflected its own arguments for less EU legislation. This
suggests that European pressure in terms of introducing a new form of
European regulation has paved the way for a relatively new British nego-
tiations procedure.
The policy type (particularly the telework agreement’s self-regulating
principle) seems important in this respect, although ongoing power games
also influenced the British choice of negotiation form. It should be noted,
however, that these negotiations coincided with those over the implemen-
tation of the 2002 EU information and consultation directive, which re-
sulted for the first time on a negotiated agreement for transposing EU
employment legislation in the UK. The influence of national labour market
tradition on the implementation process therefore seems limited. This is
further underpinned when examining the social partners and the British
government’s arguments for regulating telework through guidelines for
good practice.
The British government and social partners found it unnecessary to
transpose the telework agreement into legislation, but they initially dis-
agreed that guidelines were the right instrument. The TUC called for a
collective agreement, mainly because teleworkers were to a large extent
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already protected by existing labour laws, and the European agreement
was more about developing new forms of organizing work than securing
individual employees’ rights. The government put forward similar argu-
ments for their choice of guidelines, while the CBI advocated guidelines
as consistent with British regulatory traditions and their wish for a flex-
ible implementation method. This indicates that the telework agree-
ment’s content and voluntary nature influenced the choice of British
implementation method. Hence the negotiation process also suggests
that ongoing power games between social partners and government have
affected the implementation process.
During the negotiations, the CBI reportedly pressurized the TUC to
sign the proposed guidelines by threatening to leave the negotiations.
Interviewees also reported that the British government had strongly sup-
ported the CBI position and had threatened the TUC with exclusion from
other policy areas unless they accepted the proposed guidelines for good
practice. It was mainly to avoid stalemate and exclusion that TUC very
reluctantly signed the guidelines. We conclude that the policy type seemed
to have triggered new power games between the national government
and social partners, which largely determined the policy outcome at con-
federal level.
The extent to which the telework agreement has been transposed at sec-
toral and local levels in the UK is uncertain, but according to the British
interviewees, no sectoral agreement has so far been signed – to be expected,
because of the limited tradition of collective bargaining at sectoral level –
and none of the interviewees knew the exact number of local agreements
on telework. In sum, the British implementation process indicates that the
policy type has to some extent triggered new power games and influenced
the choice of implementation method in the UK, although national trad-
itions have to some extent been followed.
Hungary
Not all countries have developed alternative implementation methods for
the telework agreement. Hungary, for instance, has followed their national
traditions and in May 2004 transposed the telework agreement into legisla-
tion, which gives precedence to collective agreements on telework signed at
sectoral level.
During the implementation process, the government took the lead, in
sharp contrast to the implementation process in the other four countries.
According to the Hungarian interviewees, the social partners have pri-
marily contributed to the process through consultation, but generally
speaking supported the government’s proposed implementation method.
However, some interest organizations, trade unions and employers’ associ-
ations opposed such a rigid form of regulation.
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The main arguments put forward by the social partners and the govern-
ment concerned the relative weakness of social dialogue at confederal and
sectoral level. According to the Hungarian interviewees, the social partners
had themselves proposed that telework be regulated through legislation, as
they lacked the resources in terms of legal expertise to transpose the agree-
ment into collective agreements. The government referred to the relatively
weak positioning of social partners in Hungary as their main argument for
legislation (EIROnline, 2004). In Hungary, union density is about 20 per-
cent and unions are often not present in companies with fewer than 10
employees, which is the most common company size (DTI, 2006; Strøby-
Jensen, 2005). The implicit power relations between social partners and
national government seem therefore to be an important reason why legisla-
tion regulates telework in Hungary. The policy-making process further
underpins this, as the contributions from social partners were limited dur-
ing the consultation process, mainly because of their relatively few
resources and low interest in telework. The latter reason also suggests that
the telework agreement’s content to some extent influenced the choice of
implementation method. The government’s existing plans on regulating
telework through legislation may also have influenced the choice of imple-
mentation method. According to the Hungarian interviewees, telework had
for years been a high-profile issue on the government’s political agenda,
since it was seen as a way to increase the employment rate.
In sum, the Hungarian implementation process indicates that the social
partners’ meagre resources and low union density, along with the relative
weak social dialogue, have been crucial for the decision to regulate tele-
work through legislation. This suggests that the European agreement’s vol-
untary nature and self-regulating principle had only a limited effect on the
Hungarian implementation process.
Discussion and Conclusion
The European social partners’ first autonomous framework agreement on
telework has recently been transposed into national practices across
Europe. The implementation process has been rather patchy, as a range of
industrial relations scholars predicted already in the 1990s (Keller and
Sörries, 1999; Streeck, 1994). Most scholars and even the European social
partners themselves, in their latest evaluation report on the telework agree-
ment, refer to the member states’ industrial relations systems as the main
reason for the diverse implementation results. However, in our study we
have identified three parameters, which to a varying degree influenced the
choice of implementation method and procedures for negotiation and con-
sultation; national regulation traditions, ongoing power games and the pol-
icy type.
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National labour market traditions seem to have an uneven influence on
the implementation process, even in countries with strong traditions of col-
lective bargaining (Denmark, Sweden and Germany) and where policy-
makers decided to follow national traditions (Hungary, the UK and to some
extent Denmark). The ongoing power games (the balance of power between
social partners and the state during the implementation of a specific policy)
seem to have played a more substantial role in the implementation process.
Likewise, the policy type was also crucial for the implementation process.
This concept refers to three elements; the content of the agreement, the
implementation obligations and the delegation of the implementation
responsibility to national social partners rather than national governments.
It was particularly the voluntary nature of the telework agreement, its
content and self-regulating principle which paved the way for alternative
implementation methods and procedures for negotiations and consult-
ations. Some member states have no tradition of leaving labour market
regulation to social partners, which meant that new power games between
social partners and the state often were instigated. Our approach goes
beyond the arguments for path-dependency and the power resource model
of Rhodes and Marsh (1992), since some national employers’ associations
have been engaged in a form of social dialogue with their counterpart, even
though they often oppose any collaboration with trade unions at con-
federal level. In addition, some member states have developed alternative
implementation methods because of the telework agreement’s content and
voluntary nature, sometimes giving rise to new power struggles between
employers, unions and the state.
As a result, the implementation record of the selected countries suggests
that the telework agreement has most often been transposed at confederal
level, often through the development of alternative implementation methods
and procedures for negotiation and consultation. These approaches com-
monly deviate from national regulatory traditions. At confederal level,
Germany, Sweden and in part Denmark have developed alternative imple-
mentation strategies through bipartite bargaining processes (Germany,
Denmark) or common negotiations including all peak organizations
(Sweden). The UK has relied on concertation at confederal level while in
Hungary the government has engaged in consultation before enacting le-
gislation. The approach in the UK is relatively novel, since the social part-
ners took the lead in the implementation process, while the government
had a more passive role. At sectoral level, the social partners have often
failed to transpose the telework agreement in accordance with national
practice in all five countries. The different country studies questions the
notion of path dependency: even when European policies specifically
encourage member states to follow national practices and procedures spe-
cific to management and labour, the procedures actually adopted have
often proved to be very different.
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